

Reformulation of the Investigation Time Limit for Money Politics Electoral Crimes in Indonesia

Original Article

Agus Nanang Irnawan^{1*}, Maria Silvya E. Wangga², Tri Sulistyowati³

¹⁻³Faculty of Law, Universitas Trisakti, Jakarta, Indonesia

Email: ¹⁾ irnanawannanang.09@gmail.com

Received : 30 April - 2026

Accepted : 28 May - 2026

Published online : 29 May - 2026

Abstract

Money politics remains a dominant electoral violation in Indonesia and Malaysia, undermining democratic integrity and the principles of direct, universal, free, secret, honest, and fair elections. Weak law enforcement, normative disparities between election supervisory bodies and national police, and a transactional political culture exacerbate the problem. This paper analyzes criminal law policy on electoral money politics and evaluates reform implementation, focusing on the disharmonization between working-day and calendar-day investigation time limits, which affects the Integrated Law Enforcement Center's effectiveness. Using normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, and sociolegal approaches, the study finds that money politics persists through cash distribution, social assistance, and misuse of government programs. Discrepancies in time limit terminology stall many cases at investigation stages, as formal and material requirements cannot be met within tight deadlines. Current criminal sanctions lack deterrent effect due to enforcement weaknesses and evidentiary complexity. The paper recommends reformulating investigation time limits from calendar days to working days, strengthening coordination among law enforcement bodies, enhancing political financing transparency, and intensifying public political education to reinforce electoral integrity and prevent money politics.

Keywords: Democracy, Elections, Money Politics, Political Electoral Crime.

1. Introduction

Money Politics remains one of the most serious problems in the implementation of democracy in Indonesia because it not only violates electoral law provisions but also damages democratic integrity and the principle of popular sovereignty. This practice reflects the growing transactional political culture that places material relations as the primary instrument in obtaining political support. In the context of electoral democracy, Money Politics is understood as the act of giving, promising, or receiving money, goods, services, or other forms of benefit aimed at influencing the political choices of voters in general elections or regional head elections. Its impact is highly significant because the democratic process is no longer based on the capacity, integrity, and competence of candidates, but rather on the strength of political and economic capital, so that democracy shifts from a competition of ideas to a transaction of interests (Tham, 2022).

The phenomenon of Money Politics is also closely related to the increasing potential for political corruption in the administration of government. Candidates who obtain power through transactional practices tend to be driven to recoup political costs through abuse of authority, patronage, or corruption of the state budget. In the long term, this condition



strengthens political oligarchy and weakens the principle of equality in democracy because only well-funded candidates are able to compete effectively.

In Indonesia, the widespread practice of Money Politics is influenced by various structural and cultural factors, such as weak law enforcement, low transparency in political financing, and the growing pragmatic culture in society that regards the giving of money or certain assistance as normal in the political process (Syafrowi et al., 2024). This condition causes Money Politics to no longer be viewed as a serious violation, but is often regarded as an effective electoral strategy for obtaining support instantly.

Data shows that Money Politics practices remain the dominant form of electoral violation in Indonesia. This practice is not limited to the giving of cash, but has also developed in the form of social assistance, certain facilities, promises of positions, political projects, or other forms of benefit aimed at influencing voters' choices. As such, Money Politics has evolved into a systematic and recurring practice in every general election and regional head election (Singer, 2009).

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of law enforcement against Money Politics still faces various obstacles, particularly regarding the disharmony of procedural law for electoral crimes, especially in the case-handling mechanism at the Integrated Law Enforcement Center (Gakkumdu). Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections grants authority to Bawaslu to conduct research and clarification of reported alleged violations within a period of 14 working days as stipulated in Article 454 paragraph (8). However, at the same time Article 480 paragraph (1) stipulates that police investigators are required to submit the results of their investigation to the public prosecutor within a maximum of 14 days without mentioning the term "working days." This difference creates an inconsistency in the case-handling process (Siddiq & Hariyanto, 2024).

The regulatory disharmony has a direct impact on the effectiveness of coordination among law enforcement institutions and impedes the proving of electoral crimes. In practice, the difference in time limits often causes many Money Politics cases to be handled suboptimally. This situation indicates the existence of a normative weakness in the electoral procedural law system that can disrupt the principle of due process of law and legal certainty (Stojanovic, 2011).

Furthermore, the conduct of elections in Indonesia also has a very high level of complexity due to geographical, demographic, and social factors. Indonesia as an archipelagic state with more than 17,000 islands, hundreds of regional languages, and ethnic and religious diversity presents major challenges in holding elections with integrity. In the 2024 Elections, Indonesia held simultaneous elections for the President and Vice President, the House of Representatives (DPR), the Regional Representative Council (DPD), Regional Legislative Councils (DPRD), and regional heads in 542 regions.

Meanwhile, the implementation of the 2024 Simultaneous Elections still used the same legal basis as the 2019 Elections. Yet various evaluations have identified weaknesses in aspects of law enforcement, including Money Politics, institutional coordination, and the effectiveness of Gakkumdu. This indicates the need for a reformulation of electoral law policy to be more adaptive to the dynamics of transactional political practices (Rundengan, 2022).

Based on these conditions, a research gap remains in the form of suboptimal harmonization of criminal law policy in handling Money Politics and the limited availability of comparative studies with other countries in strengthening the electoral law enforcement system. Therefore, this research is important to analyze criminal law policy in handling Money Politics Electoral Crimes in Indonesia and to compare it with the electoral law enforcement

system in Malaysia, in order to formulate a model of legal reform that is more effective, just, and integrity-driven.

2. Literature Review

2.1.1. Theory of Electoral Justice in Electoral Law Enforcement

The theory of electoral justice emphasizes that an electoral system must have an effective corrective mechanism to guarantee the integrity of the democratic process (Orozco-Henríquez & Lindner, 2010). From this perspective, law enforcement is not only oriented toward procedural certainty, but also toward substantive justice so that electoral results truly reflect the will of the people. The handling of Money Politics is an important part of maintaining electoral justice, because such practices can damage the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. However, the limited investigation time limit often becomes the main obstacle in realizing the principle of electoral justice effectively.

2.1.2. Theory of Legal Effectiveness

In the theory of legal effectiveness (Soekanto, 2007), the success of law enforcement is determined by five main factors, namely the substance of the law, law enforcement apparatus, means and facilities, society, and legal culture. In the context of Money Politics, the factor of legal substance, particularly the regulation of the investigation time limit, plays a crucial role in determining the success of the law enforcement process. If the time limit is too short, then law enforcement apparatus do not have sufficient room to conduct investigations thoroughly, resulting in low legal effectiveness. This indicates that a disproportionate regulatory design can become the primary obstacle in electoral law enforcement.

2.1.3. Electoral Integrity

Electoral integrity is a concept that refers to the extent to which the entire electoral process is conducted honestly, fairly, transparently, and in accordance with democratic principles. This concept does not only assess the final outcome of an election, but also encompasses the entire electoral cycle, ranging from regulation, campaigning, political financing, voting, to vote counting and law enforcement against violations. In academic scholarship, electoral integrity is used as the primary indicator for assessing the quality of democracy in a country because it shows whether the political process truly reflects the will of the people or not.

In academic literature, this concept has developed as a measure for assessing whether elections genuinely reflect the will of the people or are instead subject to distortion due to fraud, manipulation, or abuse of power. Van Ham (2015) explains that electoral integrity is greatly influenced by the quality of electoral rules and the effectiveness of organizing institutions in overseeing all stages of the electoral process.

Research by James et al. (2019) shows that electoral integrity is not only determined by formal regulation, but also by the performance of electoral management bodies in carrying out electoral procedures consistently and accountably. When electoral institutions are weak, the risk of violations such as Money Politics, vote manipulation, and procedural abuse increases, thereby reducing public trust in electoral outcomes.

Furthermore, the study by Tarouco (2023) emphasizes that the measurement of electoral integrity must take into account the entire electoral cycle, including the stages of administration, contestation, and electoral results. From this perspective, electoral integrity is not only normative in nature, but can also be measured through empirical indicators that reflect the level of trust and quality of the electoral process across various countries.

3. Methods

This research is motivated by the disharmonization of investigation time limit regulations for electoral crimes, particularly regarding the difference in the use of the calendar day and working day systems in handling money politics cases. This difference in regulation creates coordination obstacles between the General Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) and investigators of the Indonesian National Police in the Integrated Law Enforcement Center (Gakkumdu), which has implications for delays in investigation, the non-fulfillment of formal and material requirements, and the termination of cases. Therefore, the reformulation of investigation time limit regulations is considered important to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement, legal certainty, and protection of the principle of due process of law in handling money politics electoral crimes (Marzuki, 2017).

This research uses normative legal research methods with a normative-empirical approach. Normative legal research is conducted through library research by examining primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials related to electoral crimes, money politics, and criminal law policy (Soekanto & Mamudji, 2010). This research views law as a system of norms that includes legal principles, legislation, court decisions, and legal doctrine (Nugroho & Haryani, 2020). The focus of the study is directed at analyzing the provisions of Article 480 paragraph (1) of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections as well as the principles of legal certainty and procedural justice in the enforcement of electoral crimes.

The approaches used include the statutory approach, conceptual approach, and sociolegal approach. The statutory approach is used to examine regulations related to electoral crimes and criminal procedural law, while the conceptual approach is used to analyze the concepts of due process of law, legal certainty, and criminal law policy. The sociolegal approach is used to understand the implementation of norms in law enforcement practice, particularly in coordination among Gakkumdu elements. In addition, this research also uses an empirical approach through the analysis of data on money politics case handling sourced from the Gakkumdu Center, Bawaslu, and Indonesia Corruption Watch for the period 2019 to 2024. This data is analyzed to identify obstacles in case handling due to limited investigation time and to formulate a model for norm reformulation that is more effective in supporting electoral law enforcement.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Criminal Law Policy on Money Politics in the Administration of General Elections

The money politics electoral crime is regulated in Article 523 paragraphs (1) through (3) of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections, which classifies money politics acts into three categories, namely money politics during the campaign period, the quiet period, and during the vote counting period. This regulation indicates that the legislators placed money politics practices as a serious electoral crime that can occur at all stages of elections and has the potential to influence the freedom and purity of voters' choices.

Upon closer examination, the provisions of Article 523 paragraphs (1) through (3) share the same *actus reus* element in the form of the act of promising or giving money or other materials to influence voters. The difference lies in the temporal context of the occurrence of the act, namely whether it was committed during the campaign period, the quiet period, or on the day of vote counting. Meanwhile, the *mens rea* element in these provisions is formulated in the form of intent (*dolus*), because the perpetrator consciously and deliberately commits the act to influence voters' political choices in order to obtain certain electoral benefits.

As for the formulation of criminal sanctions against money politics electoral crimes, it uses the pattern of indefinite sentencing, namely the formulation of punishment with a certain maximum limit without establishing a specific minimum limit of punishment. This model of formulation provides a fairly wide discretionary space for judges in determining the severity of punishment based on the concrete circumstances of the case. However, on the other hand, this pattern also has the potential to create disparities in sentencing and has not fully provided a deterrent effect against perpetrators of money politics electoral crimes that continue to recur in every election (Satria, 2019). The simultaneous elections in 2024 still used the Electoral Law that served as the basis for conducting the 2019 Elections. Based on the experience of the 2019 elections, there were several problems that needed to be anticipated by improving or refining the regulations for the 2024 Elections (Rundengan, 2022).

Money politics is fundamentally a practice of giving money, goods, or other forms of incentives with the aim of influencing voters' political choices so that they give their support to a particular candidate or political party in elections. In general, money politics is understood as an effort to influence voting behavior through material transactions, so that the political choices of the public are no longer based on rational considerations, the vision, or the programs of the candidate, but rather on the momentary benefits received by voters. In the context of electoral democracy, this practice constitutes a form of deviation that damages the principles of freedom and honesty in elections.

Conceptually, money politics can also be interpreted as the practice of deliberately giving cash and/or other resources to voters to influence the results of elections, not to encourage abstention (*golput*), but rather so that voters determine their choice for a particular candidate. Thus, money politics constitutes a form of manipulation of popular sovereignty because voters' choices are influenced through transactional relationships that are contrary to the principles of fair and integrity-based democracy.

Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections itself does not provide an explicit definition of the term "money politics." However, the prohibition against this practice is reflected in various electoral criminal provisions that regulate the act of giving or promising money or other materials to influence voters. This act is qualified as an electoral crime and may be subject to criminal sanctions in the form of imprisonment or fines. Regulations regarding the prohibition and sanctions against money politics practices are contained in the provisions of the Electoral Law, particularly those related to the prohibition of giving money or other materials in the campaign process, the quiet period, or during vote counting (Putra et al., 2024).

Criminal law policy is a logical and structured approach by the government to address acts of crime through criminal law mechanisms. According to Marc Ancel, criminal policy is defined as the rational organization of the control of crime by society, which indicates a deliberate effort to manage the criminal law system effectively and fairly in responding to changes in crime. In the context of money politics, criminal law policy encompasses three main aspects:

- A. Formulation (legislative policy): the development of criminal law norms in legislation (for example Articles 523, 524, and 525 of Law Number 7 of 2017);
- B. Implementation (judicial and investigative policy): the application of legal norms in law enforcement procedures carried out by Bawaslu, the National Police, and the Prosecutor's Office;
- C. Implementation (correctional policy): the application of sentencing decisions against perpetrators of money politics crimes.

The reform in criminal law policy studied here places greater emphasis on the formulation and application dimension, namely the alignment of investigation time between Bawaslu and the National Police to ensure legal certainty and the effectiveness of electoral law enforcement. From a conceptual standpoint, money politics is an activity of exchanging goods or money for political support or votes from voters, which damages the democratic order and violates the Direct, General, Free, Secret, Honest, and Fair (*luber jurdil*) principles. According to Bawaslu, money politics activities include the giving of money, goods, or commitments to voters with the intent to influence their political choices.

In the legal regulations applicable in Indonesia, electoral crimes related to money politics are explained in Articles 515 to 523 of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections. These criminal acts fall into the category of formal crimes, which means that it is sufficient to have evidence of the act of giving or promising something to voters, without needing to demonstrate a direct impact on electoral results. Conceptually, money politics has two aspects, namely subjective and objective. In the subjective aspect, namely the motivation and purpose of the perpetrator (*mens rea*), while in the objective aspect: the act of giving, promising, or receiving (*actus reus*) (Stasi, 2021). A successful investigation into both of these aspects is highly dependent on speed in handling cases, because delays can result in the loss of evidence and confusion regarding the subjective aspect of the perpetrator. It becomes a problem when the Electoral Law as a legal substance is not properly and correctly implemented, and even becomes a paper tiger because it is not supported by a correct legal system. Legal structure, legal substance, and legal culture constitute a unified legal system that greatly influences law enforcement (Rahayu et al., 2020). Lawrence M. Friedman stated that these three components are the main supporters for the functioning of a country's legal system. Friedman also stated that these three components are the determining factors of whether a legal system works well or not (Mahanani, 2019).

One of the main challenges is the low legal awareness of the public that frequently ignores legal rules. The low legal awareness of the public cannot be separated from cultural problems that ultimately hinder efforts at effective and fair law enforcement (Ningsih et al., 2024). Compounding this is the non-functioning of a strong legal structure and legal culture. Changes in the electoral system, whatever they may be, must include legal structure and legal culture. In order to realize law enforcement that provides justice and legal certainty, maximum efforts must be made in the form of legal development.

From its terminology, legal development has a more comprehensive and fundamental meaning compared to the terms legal guidance or legal reform. The understanding of legal guidance refers more to the issue of efficiency, in the sense of increasing legal efficiency. The understanding of legal reform is more directed toward the drafting of a legal order to conform to changes in society. Therefore, legal development is not only directed at legal rules or substance, but also at the structure or legal institutions and at the legal culture of society, which are elements in the legal system. The legal system is defined as a set of attitudes that have become deeply rooted and historically conditioned toward the nature of law, legal rules in society, and the political ideology, organization, and administration of the legal system (Aditya, 2019).

The principle of *lex certa* requires that every criminal law should be written clearly, without ambiguity, and easy to understand. Hans Kelsen argued that legal certainty is a vital component in a norm-based legal system. Meanwhile, due process of law as explained by Herbert L. Packer ensures that every legal stage proceeds fairly, logically, and in a balanced manner (Aviram, 2011). In the context of investigation into electoral violations, this principle demands the existence of reasonable and consistent time among various institutions to protect

the rights of both the reporting party and the reported party equally. The difference between working days and calendar days can cause procedural injustice, which has the potential to violate the principle of fairness in the legal process. Therefore, changing the investigation time to working days can be seen as the application of a fairer due process of law principle.

Legal harmonization is an effort to align legal norms so that disputes do not arise either vertically or horizontally. Barda Nawawi Arief argued that harmonization in criminal law policy is necessary so that the national-level legal system can operate in an integrative and consistent manner (Jiwanti, 2024). In this study, what is meant by harmonization is the temporal alignment of the time provisions contained in Article 454 paragraph (8) and Article 480 paragraph (1) of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections. By making the unit of time working days, then: 1) There will be no overlap between Bawaslu's evaluation process and the investigation from the National Police; 2) The Gakkumdu Center can operate simultaneously; and 3) Investigation results will not be affected by differences in time interpretation.

4.2. Criminal Law Enforcement of Money Politics in the Administration of General Elections

Law enforcement against money politics electoral crimes is a key element in creating fair and quality elections. However, in daily implementation, the effectiveness of law enforcement is often disrupted by the incompatibility of time norms in handling cases between the supervisory institution (Bawaslu) and the investigating apparatus (National Police). Bawaslu applies a unit of time in the form of working days in the inquiry process, while the National Police follows a calculation based on calendar days in the investigation in accordance with the provisions of Article 480 paragraph (1) of Law Number 7 of 2017. This difference creates legal and procedural problems that result in legal uncertainty, inefficiency in case handling, and a high rate of investigation termination (SP3) related to money politics electoral crimes. There is a strong causal relationship between the incompatibility of time norms in investigation and legal processes (working days compared to calendar days) and the minimal success in the application of criminal law against money politics acts in Indonesia.

This assumption is based on the belief that legal success does not only depend on the content of norms, but also on the alignment of procedures among various law enforcement institutions in the integrated criminal justice system (Gakkumdu). If the provisions regarding the duration of investigation in Article 480 paragraph (1) of Law Number 7 of 2017 are adjusted from 14 calendar days to 14 working days, then there will be an alignment of electoral criminal procedural law norms between Bawaslu and the National Police, which in turn strengthens the principle of fairness as reasonableness and the principle of equal freedom and the difference principle. Uniformity in the calculation of case handling time between Bawaslu and the National Police has the potential to improve the effectiveness of cooperation at the Gakkumdu Center, so there will be a significant increase in the number of money politics cases that can advance to the prosecution stage.

The change of investigation norms from calendar days to working days is an innovation in criminal law policy that is consistent with the principle of Law as a Means of Change (Roscoe Pound) because it adjusts the law to social conditions in bureaucracy and the needs of efficiency in electoral law enforcement. Money politics is an act in which money or other forms of giving are used as instruments to influence the political process, particularly in elections. Money politics can include the giving of cash, goods, promises of positions, or other benefits given to voters, officials, or certain groups with the aim of obtaining political support. According to Law Number 7 of 2017, money politics is defined as all forms of giving or promises aimed at influencing voters to choose or not choose certain election participants.

This practice is categorized as a violation that can be subject to administrative to criminal sanctions (Muhtadi, 2019).

In Malaysia, money politics is also prohibited and regulated in the Election Offenses Act 1954, which states that any act of bribery or provision of incentives in elections constitutes an illegal act (Kadir et al., 2025). Nevertheless, in practice, money politics is still frequently found in various forms, such as the provision of social assistance related to political campaigns or the use of large funds by candidates to influence electoral results. Money politics is considered a threat to democracy because it damages the principle of equality in elections, where voters should make decisions based on the programs and capabilities of candidates, not based on financial incentives. Furthermore, this practice can cause political corruption, because candidates elected through money politics tend to prioritize the interests of themselves or the groups that fund them over the interests of the people at large.

In a comparison between Indonesia and Malaysia, although there are regulations prohibiting money politics practices, the effectiveness of law enforcement and the forms of violations are often different. Therefore, further study is needed to understand how both countries handle this problem and whether there is a more effective approach to suppress money politics practices. Money politics remains a problem that is difficult to eradicate in various political systems, including in Indonesia and Malaysia. Several factors causing the widespread practice of money politics based on Fadhlurrahman (2024) includ:

- A. **Weak Law Enforcement:** Although there are regulations prohibiting money politics, implementation and law enforcement are often not effective. Many cases are difficult to prove because money politics is conducted covertly. Furthermore, the weakness of sanctions against perpetrators of money politics makes this act continue to recur without any significant deterrent effect.
- B. **Low Political Awareness of the Public:** Many voters do not yet understand the importance of clean democracy and tend to accept money or gifts from candidates as something normal. Low political education causes the public to prefer short-term benefits over considering the quality of candidates or the work programs offered.
- C. **High Political Costs:** In the modern political system, campaign costs are enormous, including for advertising, community meetings, and operational costs of campaign teams. Candidates who do not have large funds often feel they must use money politics to compete with their opponents. This encourages money politics practices as the main strategy for winning elections. *“Candidates typically campaign more to get votes for themselves personally, rather than votes for their party. Not surprisingly, candidates use three different strategies all related to money politics: ‘pork-barrelling’, clientelism, and vote buying.”* Pramono Anung details the high costs of regional elections incurred. Legislative candidates typically spend between Rp 300 million to Rp 22 billion (approximately A\$30,000 to A\$22 million) for elections. There was even one candidate who spent Rp 18 billion just for political consultants (Kompas, 2013) (Padilah & Irwansyah, 2023).
- D. **Culture of Patronage and Clientelism:** In many countries, including Indonesia and Malaysia, there is still a patronage culture, where voters expect compensation from the candidates they support. A patronage-based political system causes voters to be more inclined to choose candidates who provide direct benefits to them, compared to candidates who offer long-term policy-based programs.
- E. **Lack of Transparency in Political Financing:** The lack of clarity about campaign fund sources and the lack of regulations overseeing the flow of political funds opens opportunities for money politics practices. Candidates who receive funds from certain

parties often feel obligated to reciprocate in ways that are not transparent after being elected.

- F. **Economic Inequality and Poverty:** In areas with high poverty rates, voters are more vulnerable to money politics because of their pressing economic needs. Candidates or political parties often exploit this condition by giving money or assistance in other forms to obtain votes.
- G. **Tight Competition in Elections:** In a competitive political system, especially in countries with many candidates or parties, competition becomes increasingly tight. This encourages some candidates to use all means, including money politics, to gain more support from voters.

The preceding factors indicate that money politics is not just a legal problem, but is also related to social, economic, and cultural aspects (Anugrah, 2025). Therefore, the solution to address money politics is not only by tightening regulations, but also through increasing public political awareness, political financing reform, and strengthening electoral supervisory institutions to be more independent and firm in taking action against violations. Money politics has a significant impact on the democratic system of a country. Although elections should be a democratic event that allows the people to choose leaders based on vision, mission, and competence, the practice of money politics actually damages the basic principles of democracy. Thus there are several negative impacts caused by money politics itself:

- A. **Damaging the Principles of Healthy Democracy:** Money politics is contrary to democratic values that prioritize honesty, justice, and freedom in choosing leaders. With this practice, elections are no longer based on the quality and programs of candidates, but rather on the financial strength possessed by certain parties.
- B. **Producing Low-Quality Leaders:** Because money politics allows candidates to win based on financial strength rather than competence, many leaders who are elected are chosen not because of their capability and integrity, but because of their ability to “buy” votes. As a result, the policies produced often do not reflect the interests of the people, but rather the personal or group interests of those who supported the candidate.
- C. **Increasing Corruption in Government:** Candidates who use money politics in elections tend to view their victory as a “political investment” that must be returned. This encourages practices of corruption, nepotism, and abuse of authority to recover the capital that had been expended during the campaign (Peter Adoko Obicci, 2025).
- D. **Weakening Public Trust in Elections:** If money politics continues to occur without firm action, the public will lose trust in the electoral system and democracy itself. Voters will feel that their votes no longer have meaning because the results of elections are already determined by the power of money, not by the will of the people.
- E. **Strengthening Political Dynasty and Oligarchy:** Money politics tends to strengthen the dominance of certain groups in politics, especially those with large financial resources. This results in the birth of political dynasties and oligarchies, where power only circulates in the hands of a few political elites who have large capital.
- F. **Worsening Social and Economic Inequality:** When elected leaders prioritize their personal and group interests, the policies made will not be oriented toward the welfare of the people in general. As a result, social and economic inequality widens further, because policies more greatly benefit parties that have access to power and capital.
- G. **Hindering Political Reform and Democratic Progress:** Countries trapped in money politics find it difficult to carry out effective political reform. Anti-corruption policies,

political transparency, and good governance are difficult to implement if the political actors in power came from a corrupt system from the outset.

In essence, if we look back, money politics has a very damaging impact on democracy, both in the short and long term. Therefore, more serious efforts are needed to eradicate this practice, both through more stringent law enforcement, reform in the political financing system, increasing electoral transparency, and political education for the public to be more critical and not easily tempted by material enticements in elections. Money politics is one of the greatest threats to a healthy democratic system (Suryaningsi & Putri, 2024). Therefore, various countries have adopted regulations and laws to prevent and take action against this practice.

In Indonesia, money politics is strictly prohibited in various legislation, particularly in the context of elections. Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections. Articles 278 through 284 explicitly prohibit money politics practices at all stages of elections. The giving of money, goods, or promises to voters with the intent to influence votes is considered an electoral violation. Violators may be subject to administrative and criminal sanctions, including disqualification from elections. Law Number 10 of 2016 concerning Regional Elections. This law prohibits money politics in regional head elections. If proven to have committed money politics in a structured, systematic, and massive manner, candidate pairs can be disqualified. Regulations of the General Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu). Bawaslu has the authority to supervise and handle alleged money politics violations. If sufficient evidence is found, violations can be followed up with legal processes.

In Malaysia, money politics regulations have also been stipulated in several important laws, among them the Election Offenses Act 1954, which is the main law regulating violations in elections, including money politics. Article 10 prohibits the giving of money, gifts, or other benefits to voters to influence votes. Violators may be subject to fines or imprisonment. Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 (MACC Act). This law grants authority to the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) to investigate money politics cases. It targets politicians or candidates involved in bribery practices related to elections. Elections Commission of Malaysia (Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya - SPR). This body is responsible for overseeing elections, including efforts to prevent money politics. It has a role in enforcing regulations and ensuring transparency in the electoral process. Based on this discussion, the authors made a comparison of regulations between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Table 1. Comparison of Indonesian and Malaysian Regulations

Aspect	Indonesia	Malaysia
Main Legislation	Law Number 7 of 2017 (Elections), Law Number 10 of 2016 (Regional Elections)	Election Offenses Act 1954, MACC Act 2009
Supervisory Body	Bawaslu (General Election Supervisory Body)	SPR (Election Commission) and MACC (Anti-Corruption Commission)
Sanctions	Disqualification, fines, criminal punishment	Fines, criminal punishment
Enforcement Effectiveness	Still weak, difficult to prove, many cases undisclosed	Stricter in some cases, but legal loopholes still exist
Weaknesses	Legal loopholes are still exploited by perpetrators, sanctions provide insufficient deterrent effect	The supervisory system still has limitations in effectively taking action against violations

Although both Indonesia and Malaysia have clear regulations regarding money politics, the effectiveness of law enforcement remains a major challenge in both countries. Money politics continues to occur because of weak supervision, difficulties in proving cases, and the low political awareness of the public.

4.3. Money Politics Practices in Indonesia

Although legally prohibited, money politics practices still frequently occur in every election in Indonesia, whether in legislative elections, presidential elections (pilpres), or regional head elections (pilkada). Money politics becomes a strategy used by candidates or political parties to obtain votes in undemocratic ways. Several forms of money politics practices commonly occurring in Indonesia:

- A. **Cash Giving to Voters:** One of the most common forms of money politics is the giving of cash to voters ahead of the polling day. Candidates or their campaign teams typically distribute envelopes containing a certain amount of money in the hope that voters will give their votes to them.
- B. **Provision of Basic Necessities and Consumer Goods:** In addition to cash, money politics is also often conducted in the form of distributing basic necessities such as rice, cooking oil, sugar, clothing, or daily necessities to voters. This is often done in covert campaign activities under the pretext of social assistance (Hasan et al., 2023).
- C. **Promises and Provision of Public Facilities:** Some candidates promise the construction of public facilities, such as roads, bridges, houses of worship, or schools in certain areas on the condition of obtaining vote support from the community in that area. Although appearing to be development programs, this practice is often transactional in nature and only carried out for political interests alone (Rahyu et al., 2025).
- D. **Payments or Compensation to Community Groups or Figures:** In some cases, candidates or campaign teams provide compensation to community figures, customary leaders, or chairpersons of certain organizations so that they direct their community members to choose a particular candidate. This practice is often difficult to detect because it is conducted covertly.
- E. **Misuse of Social Assistance (Bansos):** In some elections, there are cases where social assistance that should serve the interests of the community is used as a political tool (Aspinall, 2014). The assistance is given bearing the name or image of a candidate, so that voters feel bound or obligated to give their votes to that candidate.
- F. **Giving Money to KPPS Officials and Electoral Supervisors:** Money politics does not only target voters, but can also occur in the form of bribes to officials of the Voting Implementation Group (KPPS) and electoral supervisors so that they commit fraud that benefits certain parties, such as vote inflation or manipulation of vote counting results.

Several money politics cases that have emerged in Indonesia indicate that this practice is still widespread, for example: 1) 2018 Regional Election Cases which many reports regarding the distribution of money and basic necessities ahead of polling day in various regions. Bawaslu found indications of money politics in several provinces, but most were difficult to prove legally. 2) 2019 Legislative Election Cases which some legislative candidate nominees were suspected of committing money politics by distributing money and goods to voters. Some cases were followed up, but many did not proceed due to insufficient strong evidence. 3) 2014 and 2019 Presidential Election Cases where money politics also occurred on a larger scale, such as mass mobilization with certain compensations and misuse of campaign funds for certain interests (Begovic & Cuan, 2021).

Money politics practices in Indonesia remain a major challenge in maintaining clean and transparent democracy. Although there are clear regulations, the weakness of law enforcement and still low political awareness in the public cause money politics to continue. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen electoral supervision, transparency in political financing, and education for voters so that they are not easily influenced by money politics. Although there are clear regulations, law enforcement against money politics still faces various challenges. These challenges include first, difficulty in proving cases which money politics is often conducted covertly, such as the direct giving of money or goods without any written evidence. Many voters who receive money are reluctant to report because they are afraid or feel benefited. Second, lack of effectiveness of sanctions, although there are criminal threats, punishment for money politics perpetrators is rarely applied firmly. Many cases do not reach court because of insufficient evidence or because of political intervention. Third, limitations of supervision by Bawaslu which occurred because Bawaslu has limited resources to supervise all stages of elections throughout all regions. In some cases, electoral supervisors at the regional level actually face political pressure. Lastly, transactional political culture is when many voters consider money politics as something normal, making it difficult to eliminate this practice. Candidates feel that money politics is the only way to win elections, especially in areas with low levels of political education.

4.4. Money Politics Practices in Malaysia

Although Malaysia has relatively strict regulations regarding Money Politics, such practices still frequently occur, particularly in legislative elections and general elections (Kadir et al., 2025). Compared to Indonesia, Money Politics practices in Malaysia tend to be carried out in a more concealed manner, yet still have a significant impact on the quality of democracy (Asra & Mauliansyah, 2024). This condition indicates that the main challenge lies not only in the existence of regulations, but also in the effectiveness of law enforcement and oversight of electoral violations.

In practice, Money Politics in Malaysia is carried out through various forms such as the giving of cash to voters, distribution of social assistance, utilization of government programs for campaign purposes, giving of gifts to certain community groups, and the provision of compensation to community figures and certain organizations to influence political support (Asra & Mauliansyah, 2024). These practices are generally carried out indirectly and in a concealed manner, making the process of proving violations difficult in electoral law enforcement. Several major cases in Malaysia, such as the Money Politics scandal within UMNO, the 1MDB case, and the alleged distribution of funds in the 2018 Elections, indicate that the abuse of political funds remains a serious challenge in maintaining electoral integrity. These cases demonstrate that although Malaysia has the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) with relatively strong authority, the effectiveness of law enforcement continues to face obstacles in the form of political intervention and difficulties in proving Money Politics Electoral Crimes.

Table 2. Differences in Money Politics Practices in Indonesia

Aspect	Malaysia	Indonesia
Form of Money Politics	More covert, often through social assistance and government projects	More direct, such as cash giving and basic necessities
Regulations	Election Offenses Act 1954, MACC Act 2009	Law Number 7 of 2017, Law Number 10 of 2016

Aspect	Malaysia	Indonesia
Law Enforcement	MACC has a major role, but legal loopholes still exist	Bawaslu and Gakkumdu Center, but weak in implementation
Level of Elite Involvement	Money politics scandals often involve high-ranking officials	Occurs at all levels, from regional to national elections
Public Awareness	Relatively more aware of the dangers of money politics	Many still consider money politics as something normal

Money Politics practices in Malaysia remain a serious problem in the country’s democratic system (Chin, 2022). Although regulations are in place, challenges in law enforcement continue to emerge, particularly regarding transparency in political financing, the independence of oversight institutions, and the effectiveness of oversight over the abuse of government funds in the electoral process. This condition indicates that the success of electoral law enforcement is not only determined by the existence of regulations, but also by the consistency of procedures and coordination among law enforcement institutions.

Although regulations exist, law enforcement against money politics still faces various challenges. One major issue is the difficulty in proving cases, as money politics is often conducted covertly, making it hard to obtain sufficient evidence such as witnesses or documentation for court proceedings. Another challenge is the gap in law enforcement, where cases involving high ranking officials or the ruling party are frequently not handled firmly, leading to a perception that the law tends to be stricter toward the opposition. Additionally, political influence within law enforcement institutions remains a concern, with some parties believing that the Malaysian Anti Corruption Commission (MACC) sometimes faces political pressure when handling cases that involve major political figures (Siddiquee & Zafarullah, 2022). Reform in MACC is needed so that law enforcement is more independent and impartial. Lastly, culture of political clientelism which occurs when many voters still accept money politics as part of a normal political culture. Some communities even consider assistance or donations as a “responsibility” of the candidate, not as a form of money politics.

Table 3. Comparison of Regulations and Law Enforcement with Indonesia

Aspect	Malaysia	Indonesia
Main Regulations	Election Offenses Act 1954, MACC Act 2009	Law Number 7 of 2017, Law Number 10 of 2016
Supervisory Institution	MACC (Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission)	Bawaslu, Gakkumdu Center
Punishment for Money Politics	Election results can be annulled, criminal punishment	Criminal punishment of up to 6 years, fine of Rp 1 billion
Challenges	Difficulty in proving cases, political influence in MACC	Difficulty in law enforcement, weak supervision
Biggest Cases	1MDB Scandal, Money Politics in UMNO	Money Politics in Regional Elections, 2019 Elections

Although Malaysia has fairly strict regulations regarding money politics, challenges in law enforcement remain significant. MACC has a stronger role compared to Bawaslu in Indonesia, but still faces obstacles in taking action in cases involving political elites. Compared to Indonesia, money politics regulations in Malaysia are more focused on prevention and transparency in political financing, although their implementation still needs to be strengthened. Political reform and the independence of law enforcement institutions are key to ensuring that money politics can be significantly reduced in future elections (Ramadhan & Azhari, 2023).

Money politics in Indonesia and Malaysia similarly damages democratic systems. First, it erodes electoral integrity by shifting voter preference from candidates' vision and programs to financial transactions, rewarding those who give money rather than demonstrating leadership quality or political ideology. Second, it increases corruption in government, as victorious candidates often seek to recover campaign capital through corrupt practices once in power, creating a recurring cycle where elected officials feel indebted to their financial backers. Third, it limits access for candidates with integrity, as those lacking large financial resources or strong financial backing struggle to compete and win. Fourth, it weakens public trust in democracy, leading citizens who recognize the prevalence of money politics to become apathetic, believing their votes have no impact without financial compensation (Fadhlorrahman, 2024).

Indonesia and Malaysia face relatively similar challenges in the eradication of Money Politics, particularly regarding weak law enforcement, political intervention, and low transparency in political financing (Fadhlorrahman, 2024). Therefore, the strengthening of institutional coordination, procedural consistency, and reform of the oversight system are important factors in improving the effectiveness of electoral law enforcement in both countries. Although regulations have already been put in place, money politics practices remain a major challenge for democracy in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Therefore, broader political reform is urgently needed to ensure that elections truly proceed fairly and remain free from the influence of money.

At the same time, although Indonesia and Malaysia both have established regulations to prevent money politics, there are notable differences between the two countries in several aspects. These include differences in their regulatory frameworks, the structure and authority of their supervisory institutions, the types of legal sanctions applied, and the overall effectiveness of law enforcement efforts in each country.

Table 4. Differences in Money Politics Regulations

Aspect	Indonesia	Malaysia
Differences in Money Politics Regulations		
Main Legislation	Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections; Law Number 10 of 2016 concerning Regional Elections	Election Offenses Act 1954 MACC Act 2009
Money Politic Definition	Money politics is prohibited in the form of giving money, goods, or promises to voters before, during, and after elections	Money politics is prohibited in the form of giving money, gifts, or other benefits to influence voters' votes
Campaign Financing Limits	Campaign fund limits are determined and must be reported to KPU	There are no specific rules on campaign fund limits, but non-transparent funds can be investigated by MACC
Political Influence in Regulations	Regulations frequently change based on the political interests of the ruling party	Regulations are more stable, but law enforcement is often influenced by politics
Differences in Supervisory Institutions and Law Enforcement		
Supervisory Institutions	General Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) for electoral supervision; Gakkumdu Center (combination of Bawaslu, Prosecutor's Office, and Police) for law enforcement	Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) as the main institution for combating corruption, including money politics in elections

Aspect	Indonesia	Malaysia
Authority of Institutions	Bawaslu can only recommend cases to Gakkumdu, cannot conduct direct investigations; KPU has a role in supervising campaign funds	MACC has broad authority to conduct investigations and arrest money politics perpetrators
Independence of Institutions	Bawaslu often experiences political intervention and is limited in authority	MACC is more independent but still receives pressure in major cases
Differences in Legal Sanctions against Money Politics		
Administrative Sanctions	Disqualification of candidates proven to have committed money politics	Disqualification of candidates, cancellation of election results if money politics is proven
Criminal Sanctions	Maximum sentence of 6 years imprisonment and fines of up to Rp 1 billion (Electoral Law 2017)	Imprisonment of up to 2 years or fines of up to RM 5,000 (Election Offenses Act 1954)
Seizure of Illegal Campaign Funds	Can be done if campaign funds are proven to originate from illegal sources	MACC can seize political funds considered suspicious
Annulment of Election Results	Can be done if money politics is proven to be massive and systematic	Can be done through the electoral court if there is sufficient evidence
Differences in the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement		
Capability of Law Enforcement Institutions	Bawaslu does not have execution authority, only recommends to Gakkumdu; Many cases do not proceed to court due to weak evidence	MACC has broader authority, including investigation and arrest; Cases handled by MACC more frequently reach court
Challenges in Law Enforcement	Evidence of money politics is difficult to gather because the practice is covert; Many money politics perpetrators from among officials or party elites who are difficult to reach by law	Many cases are not fully investigated due to political intervention; Major scandals such as 1MDB show the continued existence of weaknesses in taking action against money politics at the high level
Cases Previously Handled	2019 Elections: Many money politics reports, but only a few were processed legally	1MDB Scandal: Former Prime Minister Najib Razak was sentenced in a case of misuse of political funds

Based on the comparison between Indonesia and Malaysia, it can be understood that the effectiveness of law enforcement against Money Politics is not only influenced by the severity of criminal sanctions, but also by the effectiveness of institutional coordination, procedural certainty, and the independence of oversight institutions. Malaysia has relatively more integrated institutional arrangements through the MACC, whereas Indonesia still faces obstacles in coordination among electoral law enforcement institutions. Therefore, the reformulation of the investigation time limit is important to support the effectiveness of handling Money Politics Electoral Crimes and to strengthen electoral integrity substantively.

Although both Indonesia and Malaysia have regulations that govern and prohibit money politics practices, the effectiveness of implementing these rules still faces various challenges. This effectiveness can be seen from the aspect of compliance by candidates and political parties, supervision, and the success of law enforcement against violations that occur.

Table 5. Comparison of Regulatory Effectiveness in Indonesia and Malaysia

Aspect	Indonesia	Malaysia
Compliance of Candidates and Political Parties	Still low, many candidates still conduct money politics covertly	Tends to be more compliant, but cases of campaign fund misuse still occur
Transparency of Campaign Financing	Required to report campaign funds to KPU, but many dark funds are still difficult to trace	There is no strict limit on campaign financing, but MACC can investigate suspicious fund sources
Effectiveness of Supervision by Authorized Institutions	Bawaslu has limitations in supervising all cases directly	MACC has broader authority, but there is still political intervention in some cases
Number of Cases Processed	Many money politics reports, but only a small portion are processed to court decisions	Several major cases have been successfully processed (for example the 1MDB scandal), but money politics in elections is still difficult to eradicate
Rate of Candidate Disqualification due to Money Politics	Rarely occurs due to difficulty in proving cases	Can be done if significant money politics is proven
Public Awareness of Money Politics	Many members of the public still accept money politics as something normal in elections	Awareness is higher, but money politics practices still occur in the form of social assistance or political donations

Based on Table 5, it can be understood that the implementation of money politics regulations in Indonesia still faces various structural and substantive challenges. First, proving money politics electoral crimes tends to be difficult because such practices generally take place covertly, making it difficult for Bawaslu and the Gakkumdu Center to obtain adequate evidence. Second, Bawaslu's authority in handling electoral crimes is still limited to supervisory and recommendation functions, while the law enforcement process continues to depend on the police and prosecutor's office. Third, law enforcement against money politics is also frequently influenced by political interests, especially when cases involve certain candidates or political groups with dominant political power. Fourth, the culture of political clientelism that still develops in society causes money politics practices to often be considered a normal part of the electoral process, making prevention efforts less effective.

Meanwhile, in Malaysia, challenges in implementing money politics regulations are also still found, even though its supervisory system is relatively more integrated. Political intervention against the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) is one of the obstacles in handling cases involving political or government elites. Furthermore, regulations on campaign fund limits have not yet been firmly stipulated, so the use of large campaign funds is still difficult to oversee optimally. Money politics practices in Malaysia also tend to be conducted in a more covert form, such as the giving of donations, social assistance, or certain facilities, making them difficult to classify as electoral law violations.

Comparatively, Indonesia has relatively stricter sanction arrangements against money politics practices, but the effectiveness of its law enforcement still faces supervision obstacles, limitations of authority, and political intervention. On the other hand, Malaysia has a stronger supervisory mechanism through MACC, but there are still regulatory weaknesses, particularly regarding transparency and campaign fund limits. Therefore, both countries still face the same challenge, namely low transparency of political financing and the not yet optimal awareness of the public regarding the impact of money politics on the quality of democracy. This

condition indicates the need for ongoing reform in the electoral supervisory system, law enforcement, and the governance of political financing to minimize money politics practices in the democratic process.

5. Conclusion

Money Politics fundamentally undermines the basic principles of democracy because it shifts the electoral process from an arena of competition based on ideas, capacity, and integrity to mere political transactions determined by the power of capital. Under these conditions, the free will of the people in making their choices becomes distorted by the financial capacity of candidates or political parties to influence voter support. As a result, the quality of substantive democracy declines because political victory is more heavily determined by economic power than by vision, capacity, and commitment to the public interest. Furthermore, Money Politics practices are also closely related to the increasing potential for corruption in the administration of government, because elected officials tend to seek to recoup the political costs expended during the electoral process, thereby potentially giving rise to abuse of authority, budget corruption, collusion, and political patronage practices. This condition also has an impact on the declining public trust in the democratic process because society views electoral outcomes as being more determined by political transactions than by the quality of leadership.

The implication is that the eradication of Money Politics requires comprehensive and sustained efforts through the strengthening of public political education, increased transparency and accountability in campaign financing, and firm, consistent, and effective law enforcement against perpetrators. However, this study has limitations in that it has not specifically compared the effectiveness of policies across countries and has not empirically tested the direct relationship between Money Politics, voter behavior, and the level of corruption within a single analytical model. Therefore, future research is recommended to employ a quantitative or mixed-method approach and to expand the comparative scope across countries in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the impact and working mechanisms of Money Politics within democratic systems.

6. References

- Aditya, Z. F. (2019). Romantisme Sistem Hukum di Indonesia: Kajian atas Kontribusi Hukum Adat dan Hukum Islam terhadap Pembangunan Hukum di Indonesia. *Jurnal Rechtsvinding: Media Pembinaan Hukum Nasional*, 8(1), 37–54. <https://doi.org/10.33331/rechtsvinding.v8i1.305>
- Anugrah, M. G. (2025). The Influence of Money Politics on Voter Behavior During Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) in South Sulawesi Province. *Moccasin Journal De Public Perspective*, 2(3), 136–146. <https://doi.org/10.37899/mjdpp.v2i3.236>
- Aspinall, E. (2014). When Brokers Betray: Clientelism, Social Networks, and Electoral Politics in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, 46(4), 545–570. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2014.960706>
- Asra, S., & Mauliansyah, F. (2024). Money Politic sebagai Representasi Budaya Patron-Client dalam Pemilu: Perspektif Sosiologi Politik. *Jurnal Society : Pengamat Perubahan Sosial*, 4(2), 97–119. <https://doi.org/10.35308/jspps.v4i2.11502>
- Aviram, H. (2011). Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model. *Law & Social Inquiry*, 36(1), 237–261. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2010.01230.x>
- Begouvic, M. E. H., & Cuan, B. (2021). Money Politik pada Kepemiluan di Indonesia. *Sol*

- Justicia*, 4(2), 105–122. <https://doi.org/10.54816/sj.v4i2.451>
- Chin, J. (2022). Malaysia in 2021: Another regime change and the search for Malay political stability. *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2022(1), 195–210. <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789815011036-013>
- Fadhlorrahman, R. (2024). Faktor Penyebab Terjadinya Politik Uang dalam Kampanye Berdampak pada Terwujudnya Penyelenggaraan Pemilu 2024 yang Demokratis dan Berintegritas. *Aliansi: Jurnal Politik, Keamanan Dan Hubungan Internasional*, 3(1), 20–27. <https://doi.org/10.24198/aliansi.v2i2.44097>
- Hasan, E., Aminah, A., Hamil, H. J. H., & Mukhrijal, M. (2023). The Practice of Money Politics in Village Head Elections and Its Effect on The Participation Level of Beginner Voters. *Journal of Governance and Public Policy*, 10(1), 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.18196/jgpp.v10i1.15576>
- James, T. S., Garnett, H. A., Loeber, L., & Van Ham, C. (2019). Electoral management and the organisational determinants of electoral integrity: Introduction. In *International Political Science Review* (Vol. 40, Issue 3, pp. 295–312). Sage Publications Sage UK: London, England. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119828206>
- Jiwanti, A. (2024). The Legality Principle's Expansion in the National Criminal Code as a Manifestation of the Idea of Balance (Tawazun). *Journal of Transcendental Law*, 6(2), 87–100. <https://doi.org/10.23917/jtl.v6i2.6452>
- Kadir, M. Y. A., Shafiya, N., & Kurniasari, E. (2025). Regulating Political Funding in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Transparency and Accountability in Malaysia and Indonesia. *Journal of Humanity and Social Justice*, 7(2), 178–200. <https://doi.org/10.38026/jhsj.v7i2.76>
- Mahanani, A. E. E. (2019). Rekonstruksi Budaya Hukum Berdimensi Pancasila dalam Upaya Penegakan Hukum di Indonesia. *Jurnal Yustika: Media Hukum Dan Keadilan*, 22(1), 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.24123/yustika.v22i01.1954>
- Marzuki, M. (2017). *Penelitian Hukum: Edisi Revisi*. Prenada Media.
- Muhtadi, B. (2019). *Vote Buying in Indonesia*. Springer Singapore. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3>
- Ningsih, L. D., Suprihatno, A., & Rosidin, U. (2024). Politik Hukum Dalam Sistem Penegakan Hukum Di Indonesia. *Bureaucracy Journal: Indonesia Journal of Law and Social-Political Governance*, 4(3), 2570–2584. <https://bureaucracy.gapenas-publisher.org/index.php/home/article/view/447>
- Nugroho, S. S., & Haryani, A. T. (2020). Metodologi Riset Hukum. *Lakeisha, Klaten*.
- Orozco-Henríquez, J., & Lindner, R. (2010). *Electoral justice: The international IDEA handbook*.
- Padilah, K., & Irwansyah, I. (2023). Solusi terhadap money politik pemilu serentak tahun 2024: mengidentifikasi tantangan dan strategi penanggulangannya. *Jurnal EDUCATIO: Jurnal Pendidikan Indonesia*, 9(1), 236–250. <https://doi.org/10.29210/1202322821>
- Peter Adoko Obicci. (2025). Corrupt elites, administrative cadres and public service in Africa: Islands of vanity. *Journal of Management and Science*, 15(1), 42–82. <https://doi.org/10.26524/jms.15.6>
- Putra, R. S., Noorikhshan, F. F., & Sarofah, R. (2024). Problematika Penegakan Pidana Politik Uang. *Jurnal Ilmu Politik Dan Pemerintahan*, 10(1), 90–99. <https://doi.org/10.37058/jipp.v10i1.10824>
- Rahayu, D. P., Faisal, F., Sari, R., & Satrio, N. (2020). Law enforcement in the context of legal culture in society. *Law Reform*, 16(2), 276–289. <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v16i2.33780>
- Rahyu, S., Suryanef, S., Rafni, A., & Azizah, C. N. (2025). Praktek money politics dalam Pemilu Legislatif tahun 2024. *Journal of Education, Cultural and Politics*, 5(1), 24–31. <https://doi.org/10.24036/jecco.v5i1.610>

- Ramadhan, R. H., & Azhari, A. F. (2023). Strengthening Election Regulations: Saving Democracy from The Threat of Political Money in Indonesia. *Proceeding International Conference Restructuring and Transforming Law*, 2(1), 302–309. <https://proceedings.ums.ac.id/icrtlaw/article/view/3588>
- Rundengan, S. (2022). *Problematika Pemilu Serentak 2024 dan Rekonstruksi Regulasi*. JIDH Kabupaten Batang.
- Satria, H. (2019). Politik hukum tindak pidana politik uang dalam pemilihan umum di Indonesia. *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi*, 5(1), 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v5i1.342>
- Siddiq, A., & Hariyanto. (2024). Legal and Political Policy in Preventing of Money Politics: Case Study and Recommendations. *International Journal of Social Science and Religion (IJSSR)*, 5(2), 187–202. <https://doi.org/10.53639/ijssr.v5i2.242>
- Siddiquee, N. A., & Zafarullah, H. (2022). Absolute Power, Absolute Venality: The Politics of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Malaysia. *Public Integrity*, 24(1), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2020.1830541>
- Singer, M. (2009). Buying voters with dirty money: The relationship between clientelism and corruption. *APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper*.
- Soekanto, S. (2007). *Pokok-pokok Sosiologi hukum*, PT. Raja Grafindo Persada, Jakarta.
- Soekanto, S., & Mamudji, S. (2010). *Penelitian Hukum Normatif*. Raja Grafindo Persada.
- Stasi, A. (2021). Actus Reus and Mens Rea. In *General Principles of Thai Criminal Law* (pp. 25–30). Springer Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8708-5_3
- Stojanovic, A. (2011). The principle of certainty of criminal law (lex certa) in case law of the European Court of Rights. *Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta, Novi Sad*, 45(1), 455–468. <https://doi.org/10.5937/zrpfns1101455S>
- Suryaningsi, S., & Putri, N. A. (2024). Against The Practice of Money Politics: An Analysis of The Potential For Bribery Prevention In The Conduct of Elections. *Journal of Mujaddid Nusantara*, 1(2), 78–86. <https://doi.org/10.62568/jomn.v1i2.141>
- Syafrowi, S., Tanjung, D., & Siregar, R. S. (2024). Analyzing Subulussalam Community's Views on Electoral Money Politics in 2024: Implications for Leadership and Its Benefits. *Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Sharia Economics (IJSE)*, 7(1), 5405–5414. <https://doi.org/10.31538/ijse.v7i1.5549>
- Tarouco, G. da S. (2023). Integridad electoral: desarrollos conceptuales y desafíos metodológicos. *Elecciones*, 22(25), 47–86. <https://doi.org/10.53557/elecciones.2023.v22n25.02>
- Tham, J.-C. (2022). Regulating money in politics: from electoral integrity to democratic integrity. In *Comparative Election Law* (p. 410). Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788119023.00034>
- Van Ham, C. (2015). Getting elections right? Measuring electoral integrity. *Democratization*, 22(4), 714–737. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.877447>